The K-Zone: Free movement of students

Although there is no specific provisions to this effect in the ECTreaty, the ECJ has developed the law on FreeMovementOfWorkers -- which provides for education for workers and their families -- into a general right of entry and residence for students of `vocational' courses. That the Court should do this is within the spirit of the ECTreaty, if not the letter: Art. 127, for example, imposes a duty on the Council to implement a common vocational training policy. The right of residence for students is now set out in Directive 90/366.

So much seems clear. What is less clear is whether a person who travels to another member state to pursue a course of study should enjoy other benefits -- for example, financial support. It goes without saying that many member states are opposed to the idea that non-nationals can be educated at public expense. In addition, is `vocational' to be interpreted narrowly (as it is under Regulation 1612/68 governing rights of non-national workers to education), or more liberally?

Art. 12 of the ECTreaty imposes a general prohibition on discrimination on the basis of nationality, in all matters within the scope of the Treaty. Education, in general, clearly falls within the scope of the Treaty, but that does not mean that all aspects of education are subject to the principle of non-discrimination. In the case of GravierVCityOfLiege1985, the ECJ held that the principle of non-discrimination did apply to policy on `access to training'. Since the imposition of fees was something that had an impact on access to training, fees could not be levied on non-nationals exclusively.

In addition, in Blaizot (C-24/86), the ECJ held that university education, so long as it contained some element of preparation for employment, could be considered `vocational'. Morevoer, had Article 149 of the EC Treaty -- which requires the communicty to ``contribute to the development of quality education'' been in effect at that time, very likely even the exclusion of entirely non-vocational courses would not have been stipulated.

The principles of Gravier and Blaizot_ meant that any provision concerning access to almost any form of education had to be applied equally to nationals and non-nationals. However, in a number of cases, particularly BrownVSecretaryOfStateForScotland1988, the ECJ refused to extend the Gravier principle to financial support for students, much to the relief of many member states.

However, the development of the concept of `citizenship' following the incorporation of the TreatyOfMaastricht, meant that this decision had to be reviewed. In Grzlczyk2001, the ECJ considered the effect that citizenship of the Union had on Art. 12. It came to the conclusion that it was no longer necessary for an applicant to show that the substance of his claim fell within the remit of EU law. The fact that Art. 17 extended the benefits of the Treaty directly to any citizen meant that any exercise of a Treaty right (such as a right of free movement) would enage the rights of the Treaty as a whole, including Art. 12.

The exact scope of this decision has yet to be determined. However, its immediate consequence is that it will be much more difficult for member states to treat non-nationals differently to their own citizen in the award of financial assistance to students. In the recent (2003) case of Bidar, the ECJ held that Art. 17 allowed a French undergraduate student resident in the UK to obtain a student loan, on the basis that to refuse would amount to discrimination on the basis of nationality.

EULaw

Law glossary index
©1994-2006 Kevin Boone, all rights reserved