| AG's ref #2 (1992) | Sane automatism requires total destruction of voluntary control |
| Beckford v R (1988) | The grounds for self defence need to be honestly believed, but not reasonably believed |
| Bratty v AG for Northern Ireland (1963) | Prosecution may raise insanity in response to a plea of automatism; any mental disorder manifesting in violence is `insanity', not automatism |
| Condron v UK (2001) | Jury should be given an opportunity to consider whether defendant's refusal to answer questions has reasonable grounds |
| Davies v Flackett (1972) | s.16 deception requires that dishonesty coincides with the intention to deprive; the dishonesty must be cause of the deprivation |
| DPP v Lynch (1975) | Duress may be a defence to accomplice to murder |
| DPP v Majewski (1977) | Voluntary intoxication not a defence to crime requiring no specific intent |
| DPP v Morgan (1975) | A mistaken, genuine belief in consent excuses, even if not based on any reasonable grounds |
| Edwards v Ddin (1976) | Making off without payment is not theft |
| Elliot v C (1983) | Caldwell test for recklessness is entirely objective |
| Faulkner v Talbot (1981) | For an
indecent assault, the action need not be hostile or agressive |
| Hyam v DPP (1974) | `Intention' found in foresight of probable harm |
| Luc Theit Than v R (1996) | Low self control not a characteristc of the ordinary person in provocation (but see R v Smith(2000)) |
| Murray v UK (1996) | Right to silence not an absolute right under Art. 6 |
| M'Naghten's case (1843) | Insanity is a `defect of reason arising out of a disease of the mind' such that the accused did not know the `nature and quality' of the act, or did not know that it was wrong |
| R v Adomako (1995) | For gross negligence manslaughter, it is for the jury to decide whether the defendant's acts were bad enough to be criminal |
| R v Aitken (1992) | `Rough horseplay' is defence to charge of assault, even if very dangerous |
| R v Anderson (1986) | Conviction for conspiracy possible even if the conspired outcome is not desired, or even possible |
| R v Arobieke (1988) | Constructive manslaughter requires a demonstrable unlawful act |
| R v Becerra and Cooper (1975) | Withdrawal from joint enterprise requires timely notice |
| R v Bedder (1954) | Provocation should not take into account physical pecularities of the defendant (but see R v Camplin (1978)) |
| R v Bird (1985) | Unwillingness to fight is not essential for defence of self defence, but should be taken into account by jury |
| R v Blaue (1975) | Defendant takes his victim as he finds him |
| R v Boyea (1992) | Whether consent negates assault depends on the harm (objectively) likely to be caused |
| R v Brown (1993) | Consent no defence to sadomasochistic injuries |
| R v Byrne (1960) | For diminished responsibility, `abnormality of mind' winder than M'Naghten insanity |
| R v Camplin (1978) | Provocation can take into account age and gender as characteristics of the `reasonable man' |
| R v Cato (1975) | Heroin is a `noxious thing'; injection of heroin can give rise to constructive manslaughter, even with consent |
| R v Chan-Fook (1994) | Psychiatric illness can amount to bodily harm |
| R v Church (1965) | Constructive manslaughter requires mens rea as to the dangerous act |
| R v Clarence (1889) | Mistake as to circumstances of act do not vitiate consent |
| R v Collins (1972) | For a trespassory entry, some part of the defendant's body must enter the building |
| R v Burstow and Ireland (1997) | Psychiatric illness can amount to bodily harm |
| R v Caldwell (1982) | `Recklessness' is assessed objectively in criminal damage (now overruled by R v G) |
| R v Cheshire (1991) | Negligent medical treatment does not break the chain of causation; defendant's acts must a significant contribution. |
| R v Clear (1967) | `menaces' in blackmail must be sufficient to sway a person of reasonable firmness, even if the victim himself was not swayed |
| R v Court (1989) | Assault is indecent if defendant believes it indecent, or it is obviously indecent |
| R v Cunninghman (1957) | `Recklessness' is a state of mind of the defendant |
| R v Dear (1996) | Self-neglect does not break chain of causation; suicide does, but not if caused by the defendant |
| R v Doukas (1977) | Obtaining by
deception: deception must operate on the mind of the victim |
| R v Dudley and Stevens (1884) | Necessity no defence to murder |
| R v Duffy (1965) | Self defence no defence when defendant not attacked, but prevention of crime might be |
| R v Dunnington (1983) | It is an offence to aid and abet an attempt, but not to attempt to aid and abet |
| R v Eason (1971) | Attempted theft not made out if indictment too narrow |
| R v Fagan (1969) | Actus reus may extend beyond original act |
| R v Fotheringham (1988) | Self-induced intoxication does not justify mistake as to consent in rape |
| R v Garwood (1987) | `menaces' in blackmail must be sufficient to sway a person of reasonable firmness, or a particular timid victim if the defendant new of his timidity |
| R v Geddes (1996) | For attempt, evidence must be adduced to show that defendant had started to implement the offence |
| R v Gemmell (2003) | Caldwell test for recklessness affirmed (now overruled by R v G) |
| R v Ghosh (1982) | `Dishonesty' is based on the defendant's understanding of the standards of ordinary people |
| R v Gillard (1988) | `Administration' of a `noxious thing' does not require physical contact |
| R v Gomez (1993) | `Appropriation' can occur even if the victim consents |
| R v Graham (1981) | Duress requires a `sober person of reasonable firmness' to fear death or serious injury |
| R v Gullefer (1986) | For an attempt, the defendant must have `embarked on the crime' |
| R v Hale (1978) | Whether force was used `at the time of the theft' is a question for the jury |
| R v Hands (1887) | Using a false
coin in a machine is not a deception, but it is a larceny |
| R v Hennessey (1989) | Stress and anxiety are not `external factors' that can give rise to a defence of automatism |
| R v Hinks (2000) | Absolute title in civil law does not defeat `appropriation' |
| R v Horne (1994) | The standard for duress as a defence does not depend on the characteristics of the defendant |
| R v Howe (1977) | Duress is not a defence to murder or accomplice to murder |
| R v Instan (1893) | Ommission my be culpable where the defendant has assumed a duty of care |
| R v Jones and Smith (1976) | Entry to premises is `as a trespasser' if it is for the purposes of theft |
| R v Jordan (1956) | Negligent medical treatment might break the chain of causation if it exceptionally bad |
| R v Hancock and Shankland (1986) | `Intention' is evidenced by, but not determined by, foresight of harm |
| R v King (1986) | Obtaining work by deception is an offence if the deception is the operative case |
| R v Kingston (1994) | Involuntary intoxication not a defence if intent still present |
| R v Lamb (1967) | Constructive manslaughter requires an unlawful act; the mens rea for the unlawful act must be present |
| R v Lambie (1967) | Presenting a
credit card without authority to use misrepresents that defendant is authorised; unauthorised credit cards are the same as unauthorised cheques |
| R v Lawrence (1972) | `Appropriation' can occur even if victim consents |
| R v Marcus (1981) | Whether a substance is `noxious' is a question of fact and degree |
| R v Martin (1989) | Duress of
circumstances may apply when the threat is not against the defendant |
| R v Matthews (2003) | Woollin direction for intention does not compel jury to accept that foresight of virtually certain harm is determinative, it only entitles the jury to do so |
| R v Miller (1982) | Ommission to act may be culpable if duty to act results from defendant's own actions |
| R v Moloney (1985) | `Intention' found in foresight that harm is a `natural consequence' |
| R v Mowatt (1967) | `Maliciously' in assault offences means only `intentionly or recklessly' |
| R v Morris (1983) | Appropriation in theft does not require assumption of all the rights of an owner, only some |
| R v Neddrick (1986) | `Intention' is as defined in Hancock and Shankland |
| R v Olugboja (1981) | `Consent' is different to `acquiescence', but ordinarily this is not important to the jury |
| R v Owino (1995) | For self defence, the defendant must (subjectively) believe the force was (objectively) reasonable |
| R v Pittwood (1902) | Liability for ommission may arise out of contractual obligation |
| R v Preddy (1996) | Obtaining a cheque by deception is not `obtaining propery by deception' because the thing-in-action represented by the cheque always belongs to the payee |
| R v Reid (1992) | Caldwell test for recklessness is entirely objective, but a reasonable person may overlook an obvious risk by being distracted |
| R v Richardson (Diane) (1998) | For purposes of consent, mistake as to qualifications not mistake as to identity |
| R v Richardson (Nigel) (1998) | Voluntary intoxication no defence to assault, but may be defence where there is a drunken belief in consent |
| R v Roberts (1971) | Causation in assault found if events were reasonably forseeable |
| R v Rozeik (1995) | Obtaining by deception: if the person deceived knows of the fraud, then obtaining is not by deception |
| R v Satnam v Kewal (1983) | A mistaken, genuine belief in consent excuses, even if not based on any reasonable grounds |
| R v Savage and Parmenter (1991) | s.47 OAPA requires mens rea of assault |
| R v Shepherd (1987) | Duress no defence if defendant puts himself into a criminal conspiracy where threats are likely |
| R v Shivpuri (1986) | No defence to a charge of attempt that the substantive offence is actually impossible to commit |
| R v Slingsby (1992) | Whether consent negates assault depends on the harm (anticipated) likely to be caused |
| R v Smith (2000) | Jury should consider all aspects of the defendant when assessing whether his response to provocation was reasonable |
| R v Steer (1987) | `Dangerous damage' under s.1(2) CDA requires intention or recklessness towards danger caused by the damage, not by the way it is caused |
| R v Stone and Dobinson (1976) | Ommission my be culpable where the defendant has assumed a duty of care |
| R v Tabassum (1889) | Victims' mistake as to circumstances of act may vitiate consent |
| R v Weller (2003) | Jury should consider all aspects of the defendant when assessing whether his response to provocation was reasonable, including irrational jealousy |
| R v Willer (1986) | There is a
defence of duress of circumstances, if D is placed in immediate danger |
| R v Williams (Gladstone) (1983) | Action in prevention of crime justified on the basis of defendent's honestly held belief |
| R v Wilson (1996) | Consent a defence to s.20 offence if it is classed as `adornment' |
| R v Woolin (1998) | `Intention' found in forsight that harm is virtually certain |
