PLEASE NOTE: This site is no longer being maintained. All the material on it is gradually being migrated to my new collaborative law site at law.web-tomorrow.com.

©1994-2003 Kevin Boone
Home     Section index     K-Zone home
English legal system

Site search

Glossary
Confused by legal jargon? Look it up!

IT law
More hassle for web publishers

More...

Land law
The titles game: can you buy nobility?

More...

Contract law
Unfair contract terms - what a mess

More...

Legal system
Common sense and the law:- the C1 crash helmet saga

The problem with precedent

More...

Constitutional law
House of lords: who needs it?

A brief history of sleaze

More...

Criminal law
Finders, keepers: what is theft?

More...

The K-Zone
K-Zone computing

K-Zone law

K-Zone education and science

K-Zone motorcycles

K-Zone DIY

K-Zone railways

K-Zone martial arts

About the author

K-Zone home page

 
English law
The problem with precedent
Guildford: 4, Justice: nil
Common sense and the law: the C1 crash helmet saga
What is a `Citizen's arrest?'
Arrest and detention: know your rights
Police search: know your rights
English legal system caselaw crib-sheet
Legal aid: the price of not being able to afford it

Recent developments in the funding of legal services have had the result that fewer people than ever are elligible for publically funded legal support, and that the amount that the state recovers from supported litigants - successful or unsuccessful - is larger than ever before. Moreover, the Law Society claims that in some parts of the country there may now be no publically funded support available at all. This article will argue that these changes are wholely inappropriate: justice now not only has a price, but the price is rising. In addition, it will show that the total cost to society of public legal services is not only justifiable, but nugatory when compared to other public services. The fact that the UK has the largest per-capita spending on public legal services in Europe should be a matter for pride, not embarassment. If the cost of funding legal aid is to be checked, it can best be done by controlling legal costs in general.

The first years of the public legal aid system - the early 1950s - were perhaps the closest that justice came to having no price. In those days there were relatively few lawyers (compared to the present day) and relatively few litigants (again, compared to the present day). Approximately 80 percent of the adult population was elligible for assistance. Over the next twenty years this situation changed dramatically. The scope of public legal aid was increased to encompass more cases in more courts; people became more willing to resort to litigation; the increased availability of divorce led to a larger number of family cases; and the decline in the UK's economic fortunes meant that people were more likely to find themselves litigants. Throughout this time, the whole system remained demand-led: any applicant that satisfied the means test and the merits test could be funded. As a result, the cost of the system increased dramatically.
      Governments from the 1970s to the present day have sought to impose control on legal aid spending, in a number of ways: the elligibility criteria have been made more stringent; the range of actions that will be supported has narrowed; and litigants have increasingly been expected to pay at least part of the cost. More controversially, recent Governments have started to encourage the use of entirely different funding models, particular conditional fee agreements (CFAs). Indeed, Lord Mackay -- the most recent Conservative Lord Chancellor -- expressed a long-term goal of removing state funding of legal services completely. The most recent reforms, enacted in the Access to Justice Act 1999, have had the following effects. First, the Legal Aid Board has been replaced by a new administrative structure headed by the Legal Services Commission (LSC). It is now necessary for practitioners who carry out publically funded work to have specific contracts with the LSC. The LSC's budget for civil legal aid is capped.
      Second, the eligibility criteria were again made more stringent. Funding for civil actions is now avilable only for litigants of very meagre means - the thresholds are approximately the same as for income support. It appears that about 5 percent of the population are within this threshold.
      Third, except for a few types of action, even the poorest litigants may have to pay a contribution from their income if they are represented in court.
      Fourth, the `statutory charge' applies to most civil cases. This allows for the costs of the case to be recovered from a successful litigant from any damages awarded against the losing party. In other words, money is recovered by the state from both successful and unsucessful litigants in many types of action. Since the average cost of a county court action appears to be 60-70 percent of the sum recovered (according to the Law Society) the statutory charge will be particular harsh if the winner's full costs cannot be recovered from the loser.
      Fifth, the types of claims inelligible for support are again widened. There is now no public support at all for defamation actions, most tribunal hearings, personal injury actions, or any company or business matters. These are expected to be funded -- if at all -- through CFAs or insurance.
      In short, traditional `legal aid', in which the entire cost of legal support is met by the state, remains available only in criminal cases where the `needs of justice' require it, and for access to a duty solicitor.
      Changes to the legal aid funding model have also had the effect of reducing the profitability of legal aid work for the practitioner. Even the Legal Services Commission had to admit that in the period 2001-2002 6 percent of contracted suppliers left the system. According to the Law Society's recent consultation paper `The future of publically funded legal services', up to 50 percent of practices are considering considering giving up public work. The most common reason cited was the marginal profit such work now generates; the second most common was the increased beaureaucracy engendered by the new administrative structure.
      The current Lord Chancellor has pinned his hopes on the success of CFAs as an alternative means of funding litigation. However, CFAs only have a future if they are workable for the practitioner, as well as the litigant. For the litigant, a problem with CFAs is that if the case is lost, the CFA will not cover the winning side's costs. Although `after the event' (ATE) insurance is available for personal injury cases, it remains unclear to what extent the premium is recoverable if the funded litigant does eventually win the case. In Callery v Gray the House of Lords supported a Court of Appeal decision that a premium of £350 was recoverable, but neither court was prepared to lay down general rules about the level of premium that should be recoverable. For the practitioner, the cost of losing CFA-fundeded cases has to be offset from the gains from winning cases; hence it will be necessary to charge an uplift over normal fees. Again, it remains unclear how much uplift can normally be recovered. In principle, the uplift can be as high as 100 percent. However, the Court of Appeal decision in Halloran v Delaney has unsettled solicitors by stipulating that the uplift in uncomplicated cases that settle before a hearing should be capped at 5 percent. If the recent reforms in civil procedure do turn out to front-load costs to the extent feared (as descibed, for example, by Professor Zander in his recent lecture to the Denning Society) then CFAs may not be economically viable for the practitioner. In any event, CFAs sit uneasily with the long-standing indemnity principle; it is reasonable to ask why the costs paid by the loser of an action should depend on whether or not the winner was funded by a CFA, or had to take out ATE insurance.
      Even if CFAs are workable in specific cases, there remains the risk that practitioners will accept only cases where the outcome is a near-certain win, leaving difficult or marginal cases unsupported.
      Despite the reduction in the level of service, the cost to the taxpayer of publicly funded legal services has continued to increase. According to the LCD, the total expenditure for the year 2002 was about £1.7 billion. One has to wonder where this money is going. Although there is a popular belief that it is lining the pockets of rapacious lawyers, at least one London burrough now offers subsidised housing to legal aid solicitors. The Legal Aid Practitioner's Group has estimated the total income of a London solicitor who does primarily legal aid work at £25000-£30000, which is in the same range as a teacher or nurse. If this figure is generally applicable, it is hard to see how the Lord Chancellor's other cost saving proposals - such as using only state-employed defenders for criminal cases, and opening up probate and conveyancing to non-solicitors - will save much money, without reducing the quality of advice and advocacy. Worse, such moves might have the effect of forcing small law practices out of business altogether.

The expenditure on legal aid needs to be put into context. The UK currently spends approximately £56 p.a. per wage-earner on funding legal aid. This includes both civil and criminal cases. Based on figures from the Labour Government's last Budget, and assuming that there are thirty million wage-earners in the UK, current expenditure on the National Health Service is £1,800 p.a. per wage earner, education £1,500. If estimates provided by the DSS are correct, as a nation we spend much more on fraudulent welfare payments than the entire legal aid budget. According to the last Budget, it is expected that total expenditure on public services in 2003 would be £263 billion, or £8,700 p.a. per wage-earner. Legal aid spending is a drop in the ocean.
      In addition, as a society we need to evaluate the cost of not providing legal services, which will be felt in social dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement. It can be argued that access to the courts is a basic civil right. A civilised democracy may give its populace the right to education, healthcare, and welfare at the public expense, but it has also to give it the right to take legal action to ensure that these other services are properly provided. It may be in the public interest that certain cases be litigated; lacking funding they may never be.
      It would be interesting to know how much of the legal aid budget goes to the suppliers of services, and how much is spent administering the system. I submit that the best way to reduce legal aid expenditure is to tackle the problem of the high costs of the legal process in general. Lord Woolf's recent reforms set out to do this for the civil justice system, but early indications are that costs are not coming down. In this context, it is interesting to note that in his original report on the civil justice system, Lord Woolf repudiated the notion that increasing the uptake of CFAs would reduce the total cost of civil justice to society. Unless lawyers are prepared to meet the cost of losing CFA-funded claims from their own pockets, this must surely be correct.

In summary, an ever-increasing number of people of modest means are becoming unable to afford access to legal services, and are not being provided with a workable method of financing their claims. It would cost relatively little to rectify this situation, and it may rectify itself if the more fundamental problems of legal costs were resolved.