|
|
|
Home > Law > Law glossary > Law glossary
Murray v United Kingdom (1996)
Last modified: Thu Feb 23 16:37:37 2006
This case ([1996] 22 EHRR 29) demonstrates the interaction between
the EuropeanConventionOnHumanRights and UK legislation
that seeks to limit the accused's RightToSilence.
Currently such legislation is embodied in the
CriminalJusticeAndPublicOrderAct1994, but at
the time and place of murray the relevant enactments were
the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (1989)
and its subordinate Orders.
Murray was a was member of the IRA. He was arrested in connection with
terrorism charges, in particular for conspiring to murder a police
informer who was held captive in the house in which Murray was arrested.
He maintained his
silence for the entire proceedings. In particular, he refused to provide an
explanation for his presence in the house, despite being cautioned that
his refusal to answer could be held against him. In total,
he was questioned for over 20 hours without being allowed access to legal advice. At
trial, the judge warned him that his inability to give an account of himself could
be interpreted as evidence against him. Under the relevant UK legislation both the
denial of access to legal advice, and the warning that his silence could be
adversely interpreted, were permissible. The case wase tried by a judge alone,
as was conventional in terrorism cases in Norther Ireland
(see: DiplockCourt). The judge stated that he was prepared to
accept the accused's refusal to account for his presence in the house
in a `common sense' way; accordingly he was convicted of
conspiracy to murder and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. His appeal to
the Court of Appeal failed. He then appealed to the
EuropeanCommissionForHumanRights, on the grounds
that the denial of access to legal
advice, and the drawing of adverse inferences from his refusual to testify,
were in contravention of Article 6(1) of the Convention. This Article
provides, in broad terms, the right to a fair and impartial trial.
In defence, he noted that the Commision had already decided
in SaundersVUnitedKingdom1996
that UK legislation which compelled a Self-incrimination from a
person accused of a criminal charge was incompatible with Article 6.
A similar decision was reached in Funke v France (1993).
However, these cases had in common that the accused was placed under
a compulsion to provide incriminating evidence, whereas in Murray
the right to silence was explicitly protected. The judgement said:
``On the one hand, it is self-evident that it is incompatible with the
immunities under consideration to base a conviction solely or mainly on the
accused's silence or on a refusal to answer questions or to give evidence
himself. On the other hand, the Court deems it equally obvious that these
immunities cannot and should not prevent that the accused's silence, in
situations which clearly call for an explanation from him, be taken into
account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution.''
In summary, Article 6(1) did not give an asolute right to silence.
However, when combined with the refusal to allow legal representation, this
was taken as a breach of Article 6(1). It should be noted that neither
decision was unanimous.
CaseLaw
Law glossary index
|
|
|
|
Shameless plug
|
 By the author of this site. Buy on-line from Amazon USA | UK
|
|